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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.

:
:
:
Case No. 20060189

WADE MAUGHAN
Defendant/Appellant

:
:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case involves an interlocutory appeal from a district court order that
disqualified one of Defendant/Appellant Wade Maughan's defense attorneys in a capital
murder prosecution. The order required Mr. Maughan to choose to keep one of his
defense attorneys and to remove the other. Under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a),
this Court has discretion to grant an appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court.
On March 1, 2006, this Court granted both parties' requests for interlocutory review.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Perceiving some undefined legal bar, the trial judge ordered Mr. Maughan to
choose to retain one of his two appointed counsel and to dismiss the other. Appointing
counsel to represent indigent defendants invests in defendants all of the constitutional
protections incident to the right to counsel, including the constitutional right to retain

counsel of one's choosing. Did the trial judge commit structural error in removing one
defense attorney over Mr. Maughan's objections and even though he waived any possible
conflict of interest? This Court reviews the disqualification of counsel for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, If 88, 63 P.3d 731.
2. The prosecutors requested disqualification of the defense team based on their
perception that the team obstructed justice. A court may only interfere in the attorneyclient relationship by seeking the disqualification of counsel under compelling and
flagrant circumstances. Did the trial judge erroneously remove one defense attorney
based on the mere perception of a conflict? This Court reviews the disqualification of
counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^j 88, 63 P.3d 731.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND COURT RULES
Addendum A:
Addendum B:
Addendum C:

Utah P.. App. P. 5(a)
U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
Utah R. Crim. P. 8

Addendum D:

18 U.S.C. § 3005
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Utah Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("UACDL") adopts the
statement of the case, including the factual background, as detailed in Mr. Maughan's
brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge violated the attorney-client relationship by removing one defense
attorney and ordering Mr. Maughan to choose to remove the other attorney. Once counsel
2

is appointed, criminal defendants are entitled to all of the constitutional protections
incident to the right to counsel. These protections include the right to retain counsel of
one's choosing. The right to retain chosen counsel is especially important in capital cases
where the potential penalty is greatly heightened. Given the sanctity of this right, trial
judges may only remove chosen defense counsel based on extraordinary and flagrant
circumstances.
The prosecution sought to disqualify the entire defense team in this case based on a
mere perception of impropriety. Allowing disqualification under such weak
circumstances would allow the prosecution to remove counsel arbitrarily. When, for
example, the prosecution desires less competent or qualified defense attorneys, it could
seek disqualification.
In this case, the prosecution's speculative allegations are particularly troubling
because the defense team not only acted properly but its diligent efforts to vigorously
investigate the case were exemplary. Under the standards that the United States Supreme
Court has established for capital cases, the defense team was a model of diligence in
immediately beginning its investigation, employing an investigator, and interviewing key
witnesses. Rather than remove the defense team, the trial judge should have commended
it for its efforts.
Were this Court to uphold the trial court, this Court would encourage prosecutorial
interference in the attorney-client relationship. Prosecutors must play no role in choosing
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defense counsel. For that reason, courts strenuously resist prosecutorial attempts to
disqualify defense counsel. In facts, under circumstances similar to this case, courts
presume improper motives when the prosecution requests to disqualify competent defense
counsel.
Upholding the disqualification of defense counsel in this case will result in even
more drastic consequences for capital defendants. This Court only allows competent,
able, and highly-qualified defense counsel to represent capital defendants. Removing
defense counsel under the questionable circumstances found here would discourage able
defense attorneys from accepting capital appointments. The fear of attacks on their
integrity and diligence would force defense counsel to be constantly looking over their
shoulders. The pool of eligible defense counsel would dwindle or even vanish. These
concerns are especially acute in rural areas where few defense attorneys are already
practicing law. Only by firmly and definitively protecting the attorney-client relationship
can this Court ensure the competent representation of capital defendants.
ARGUMENT
To preserve the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship and to ensure the
competency of defense counsel, amicus curiae, UACDL requests that this court reverse,
in part, the district court's decision allowing defendant to choose one of his defense
attorneys, and disqualifying the other. The Sixth Amendment requires nothing less than
the best and most thorough preparation in capital cases, since a person's very life is at
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stake. Thus, a death penalty case demands the most exhaustive investigation counsel can
give it, including interviewing all potential witnesses and researching all aspects of the
case. Contrary to the prosecution's contradictory and vague allegations, the defense team
not only acted properly in interviewing witnesses, it fulfilled its constitutional duty to
promptly and diligently investigate Mr. Maughan's case. Affirming the district court's
decision would send a clear message to defense counsel that the courts and prosecutors
can interfere in investigations in death-penalty cases. The obvious consequence of
closely monitoring defense counsel's investigation would, in turn, dissuade competent
counsel from seeking capital appointments. Then, unqualified defense attorneys could
conceivably be appointed death-penalty cases, especially in rural areas where few defense
counsel practice law. These constitutional and related policy reasons should persuade this
Court to reverse the district court's ruling.
I.

REMOVING THE DEFENSE TEAM BASED ON
UNFOUNDED AND SPECULATIVE GROUNDS,
AGAINST COUNSEL'S AND DEFENDANT'S WISHES,
VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO RETAIN CHOSEN COUNSEL.

The district court's decision to disqualify defense counsel undermined the right to
effective counsel as well as the companion right to retain counsel once the courts have
appointed an attorney to represent a capital defendant. In requesting that the district court
disqualify defense counsel, the prosecution set forth contradictory and ambiguous
allegations of misconduct. But, removing defense counsel for aggressively and aptly
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investigating Mr. Maughan's case violated the minimum standards for defense counsel
and unconstitutionally interfered with the attorney-client relationship. Rather than
exhibiting misconduct, the defense team competently handled the investigation, consistent
with constitutional requirements and minimum quality standards.
A.

Criminal Defendants Have A Constitutional
Right to Maintain Existing Relationships With
Appointed Counsel.

Once a trial court appoints counsel to represent an indigent defendant, the
defendant is entitled to all of the constitutional protections incident to the right to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to "have the
Assistance of Counsel[.]" U.S. Const. Amend. VI. This right encompasses the
companion right to "choose one's own counsel

" Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.

153, 159 (1988). To secure these rights, the Sixth Amendment further guarantees that
criminal defendants may "preserve" an existing attorney-client relationship once counsel
has been appointed to represent them. State v. Huskey, 82 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2002).
The right to retain appointed counsel protects indigent defendants from
unwarranted intrusions into attorney-client relations:
[T]he attorney-client relationship . . . involves not just the casual
assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of
consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and
confidence between the client and his [or her] attorney. This is
particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the
client's life or liberty. Furthermore, the relationship is independent of
6

the source of compensation, for an attorney's responsibility is to the
person he has undertaken to represent rather than to the individual or
agency which pays for the service. It follows that once counsel is
appointed to represent an indigent defendant, whether it be the public
defender or a volunteer private attorney, the parties enter into an
attorney-client relationship which is no less inviolable than if counsel
had been retained. To hold otherwise would be to subject that
relationship to an unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising
merely from the poverty of the accused.
Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968) (internal citations omitted); see also
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 147, 152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (relying on Smith);
People v. Johnson, 547 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Huskey, 82 S.W.2d
at 305-06 (same).
Given the sanctity of this relationship, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly ruled
that a defendant's interests in keeping counsel of his choice is "strong and deserves great
respect." State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 490 (Utah. Ct. App. 1991); see also State v.
Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 88, 63 P.3d 731; State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962, 964 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). Further, to preserve the fundamental right to retain chosen counsel,
whether appointed or not, the "trial court must recognize a presumption in favor of
defendant's counsel of choice." Arguelles, 2003 UT at \ 88, 63 P.3d 731. Other courts
agree that disqualification of counsel is "a harsh remedy that should be invoked
infrequently." State v. Ehlers, 631 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Neb. 2001); see also United States
v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 626 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 500 U.S. 920 (1991); Hading
v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 191^); Jordan, 733 N.E.2d at 152;
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Johnson, 547 N.W.2d at 69; In re Contempt Proceedings Concerning Richard, 373
N.W.2d429,433(S.D. 1985).
The retention of chosen counsel in a capital case is even more protected than in
non-capital cases. Because "[t]he defense of a capital case often requires a close and
trusting relationship between counsel and client," courts must do all within their power to
alleviate anything that would rupture this relationship. State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939,
997 (N.J. 1988). A defendant's relationship with an attorney is especially "crucial when
he is fighting for his life." Smith, 440 P.2d at 74. Thus, the "bond of trust [which is]
especially necessary in capital cases" should not be lightly severed. State v. Griffin, 838
So.2d 34, 39 (La. Ct. App. 2003). Courts may only disrupt appointed counsel's
representation in capital cases "when no other options exist." Huskey, 82 S.W.2d at 309.
Instead, courts must consider alternatives such as censure, filing a bar complaint, and
fines or jail for contempt of court. Id. at 311.
With these weighty principles in mind, courts may only sever an attorney-client
relationship under extremely rare circumstances. To support disqualification, counsel
must have an actual or serious potential conflict of interest with a client or based on
counsel's "gross incompetence, physical incapacity, or contumacious conduct." Johnson,
547 N.W.2d at 68; see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 (2002); Wheat, 486 U.S.
at 164; Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 88, 63 P.3d 731. It is improper to disqualify a
defendant's chosen counsel arbitrarily or simply because the trial court or the prosecutor
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desire different counsel on the case. Grant v. State, 607 S.E.2d 586, 56-87 (Ga. 2005);
State v. Carver, 95 P.3d 104, 114-15 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
B.

The Prosecution Not Only Presented No
Justification to Disqualify the Defense Team,
Defense Counsel Has Faithfully Fulfilled Their
Constitutionally-Required Duties to Investigate
and Interview Witnesses in the Presence of a
Third-Party.

None of defense counsels' actions in this case even approach the high standard for
disqualification. To the contrary, counsel had faithfully fulfilled their constitutionallyrequired duties to investigate both the allegations against Mr. Maughan and to
immediately prepare for a possible death-penalty hearing. The defense team not only
acted properly, but was a model of the high-quality representation required in capital
cases. Instead of halting defense counsel's efforts, the district court should have
respected Mr. Maughan's wishes and allow his defense team to continue to vigorously
represent him.
/.

No Evidence Supports the
Prosecution 9s Allegations; Rather,
the Prosecution
Assumes
Misconduct Absent
Reliable
Evidence.

The prosecution's allegations provide no basis for disqualifying defense counsel.
Rather than repeating the serious problems with the witnesses' credibility and reliability,
UACDL refers this Court to the defense team's appellate brief. Mr. Maughan's brief
details wide and, ultimately, fatal gaps in the prosecution's contentions. UACDL fully
9

concurs that the prosecution's witnesses never alleged any actual interference in the
prosecution's case. They have merely offered vague, contradictory, and malleable
statements that change depending upon who interviews them.
In contrast to these conflicting statements, courts may only disqualify counsel
based on solid evidence of a conflict as opposed to mere allegations of misconduct.
Phillips v. HaideU 695 N.E.2d. 292, 296 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). Given the sanctity of the
lawyer-client relationship, parties requesting disqualification must produce specific
evidence of a conflict that cannot be remedied; "[m]ere allegations ...will not suffice
under this standard." Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998). Any other standard would allow courts or prosecutors to remove counsel
arbitrarily in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to retain chosen counsel. Carver, 95
P.3d at 114-15. As explained more fully in the defense team's brief, none of the
prosecution's allegations justified questioning the defense team's conduct.
The prosecution's allegations were particularly troubling because they demonstrate
a readiness to assume misconduct in the absence of any evidence. Rather than assuming
the worst, the prosecution has a duty to presume that defense lawyers act within the
bounds of the law and their ethical duties. "Lawyers, as attorneys and counselors at law,
are officers of the courts of this state and take a special oath subjecting them to the Rules
of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court." Applied Med. Tech.
v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ^J20, 44 P.3d 699. Accordingly, prosecutors should hesitate to
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infer misconduct when "there is no evidence, nor any reason to presume" that counsel
acted with an unethical or improper "motive." Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^[92, 63 P.3d 731.
By so aggressively injecting itself into the defense investigation, the prosecution
has exhibited a proprietary interest in the witnesses. This approach reflects a
misunderstanding of the law. Because the importance of "interviewing witnesses is
undeniable, particularly in a criminal case where a defendant's very liberty is at stake . . .
witnesses are the special property of neither party." United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d
799, 804 (5th Cir. 1979). Both sides have an equal right to interview and talk to witnesses.
Id. Governmental interference with that right occurs when the government seeks to
prevent witnesses from speaking with defense representatives. Workman v. Bell, 178
F.3d 759 (6th Cir. 1998).
Although no Utah cases address the specifics of this case, other courts have
rejected identical claims of alleged witness tampering by the defense. In Stearnes v.
Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), the prosecutor in a capital case
demanded that appointed defense counsel obtain his permission before interviewing any
witnesses. Despite this warning, defense counsel met with a key witness who then
contacted the prosecutor. Id. Just like the prosecution's claims in this case, the
prosecutor in Stearnes argued that defense counsel's actions rendered him a prosecution
witness and created a conflict of interest with the defendant. Id. The trial judge agreed,
immediately inferred that defense counsel's conduct showed incompetence, and angrily
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removed counsel from the case. Id.
The appellate court strenuously chided the trial judge and unequivocally ruled that
defense counsel had a right and an obligation to interview all witnesses in preparation for
trial. Id. at 223-24. The court ruled that interviewing witnesses provided no basis for
removing defense counsel over the defendant's objections:
[I]t is tenuous to claim that attorneys merely talking to a witness
"leave themselves wide open to ..." allegations of impropriety.
If merely talking with a witness produces a disqualification
because there is a mere possibility that claims of misconduct
could be made, then all investigators, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers will invariably be subject to being removed. That simply
and understandably is not the law.
Id. at 224.
This case is identical to the defense team's actions here. Like the defendant in
Stearnes, Mr. Maughan faces capital charges. Further, his appointed defense counsel
interviewed witnesses in preparation for trial. Similarly, the prosecution here, like in
Stearnes, sought to remove defense counsel based on "apparently unfounded speculation"
of misconduct and incompetence. Id. at 224. And, as in that case, the defense team
employed an investigator to accompany defense counsel in interviewing the witnesses.
Also, the district court removed defense counsel for the conduct, the same as which
occurred here. Id.
As the Stearnes court concluded, the conduct in this case was not only proper but
was constitutionally required to provide the effective assistance of counsel. Rather than

12

defense counsel having a conflict of interest, the prosecution's interference in the defense
investigation divides defense counsel's "loyalty" to the client and destroys the
"independence" that is necessary to effectively represent the defendant, especially in a
capital case. Id. at 220-22. Like in Stearnes, the defense team's only offense was its
'"determination to effectively represent the defendant.'" Id. at 221 (quoting Hading, 387
A.2datll02).
Likewise, in United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 376 F.Supp.2d 118, 119 (D. P.R.
2005), federal prosecutors demanded that defense counsel provide notice before
interviewing witnesses. The federal district court ruled, citing established precedent, that
neither the trial judge nor the prosecution own any witness; to the contrary, the defense
and prosecution have equal access to witnesses. Id. at 120. Scolding the prosecution, the
court held that "[t]he free choice of a potential witness to talk to defense counsel must
remain unconstrained and the prosecution improperly interferes with a defendant's right
of access to the witness if it imposes unjustified limitations." Id.
As in Rodriguez-Berrios, the prosecution's attempted and successful interference
with Mr. Maughan's efforts to interview key witnesses violated Mr. Maughan's right to
effective counsel absent "the clearest and compelling considerations." Id. Instead, the
prosecution asserted conflicting, ambiguous, and unreliable accounts of interactions with
the defense team. These allegations provided no basis for interfering with the defense
investigation or Mr. Maughan's relationship with his appointed counsel. Id.
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2.

The Defense Team Diligently
Represented the Defendant and
Merely Fulfilled Its Minimum
Constitutionally-Required Duties
in Investigating the Case and
Interviewing Key Witnesses.

As these cases illustrate, interviewing and investigating witnesses not only fails to
support disqualification, but those activities are constitutionally-required minimum
standards. The United States Supreme Court has held that counsel's failure to fully
investigate and examine a capital defendant's past falls below a reasonable level of
performance and prejudices the defendant such that habeas relief is warranted on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387, 125
S.Ct. 2456, 2466 (2005)(despite statements from defendant and his family that no
mitigating factors existed, defense counsel had obligation to make reasonable efforts to
find and examine mitigating material); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-25 (2003)
(counsel's decision not to expand investigation of defendant's life history beyond that
presented in social services records fell short of prevailing professional standards and
prejudiced defendant). More simply put, defense counsel has a "responsibility to seek out
and interview potential witnesses." Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d at 224.
In requiring defense counsel to find and interview potential witnesses, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the American Bar Association's ("ABA")
Standards for representing defendants in capital cases. See Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2466;
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522. Those standards emphasize that \o be qualified to represent
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capital defendants, defense counsel must have "demonstrated a commitment to providing
zealous advocacy and high quality legal representation in the defense of capital cases"
and must possess skill in "investigation, preparation, and presentation of evidence."
American Bar Association: Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 961 (2003). Simply because an
attorney has prior experience in death penalty cases, counsel should not be appointed on
subsequent capital cases if counsel has not shown the "level of proficiency or
commitment necessary for the adequate representation of a client in a capital case." Id. at
964. Rather, counsel in capital cases should provide "high quality" legal representation, a
qualitative trait, rather than quantitative. Id. at 963-64.
Under the ABA's standards, defense counsel in capital cases must, at a minimum,
conduct a "searching" and "exhaustive" inquiry. Id. at 955, 959. The standards require
counsel to "seek out and interview potential witnesses" to support possible defense at the
guilt phase and other witnesses who are "familiar with aspects of the client's life history
who might affect the likelihood" of being convicted and/or sentenced to death. Id. at
1019. Because sentencing factors may be found in virtually any part of the defendant's
life, "[i]t is necessary to locate and interview the client's family members . . . and
virtually everyone else who knew the client and his family." Id. at 1024. Counsel has a
"duty to investigate the case thoroughly, [a duty which is] intensified .. .by the unique
nature of the death penalty." Id. at 1016.
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Because of the enormous burden a capital case places upon defense counsel, and
the sheer amount of work involved, counsel should employ an investigator as part of the
defense team at every stage of the proceedings. Id. at 958. Further, "[t]he mitigation
investigation should begin as quickly as possible, because it may affect" first phase issues
such as defense strategy, motion practice, and plea negotiations. Id. at 1023. The ABA's
standards also mandate that either investigators interview witnesses or that defense
counsel "conduct interviews of potential witnesses in the presence of a third person so
that there is someone to call as a defense v/itness at trial." Id. at 1020.
The defense team's conduct in this case models these standards. As detailed in the
defense team's brief, within days of being appointed, the defense team dispatched
attorney Richard Mauro and investigator Ted Cilwick to interview'key witnesses in
Spokane, Washington. These persons had knowledge about the voluntariness of Mr.
Maughan's statements to the police that directly addressed Mr. Maughan's guilt or
innocence. Moreover, the witnesses were life-long friends of Mr. Maughan who could
document his background, character, and social history.
The defense team's prompt vigorous action mirrored the type of representation that
the Supreme Court has demanded under the ABA's standards for capital cases. Rompilla,
125 S.Ct. at 2466; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522. The team immediately began to investigate
Mr. Maughan's case and diligently traveled several hundred miles to contact vital defense
witnesses. Just as the ABA's standards specify, Mr. Mauro took an investigator with him
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in the event that a third-party would need to testify as a witness at a subsequent court
proceeding. Thus, rather than creating some unexplained conflict or bullying witnesses,
the inclusion of Mr. Cilwick in the investigation not only followed the prescribed
procedures but has also proven to be prophetic in light of the prosecution's allegations.
In sum, the defense team's conduct was not only proper, it reflected the minimum
standard of conduct required under the Sixth Amendment. This conduct was further
consistent with the ethical duties for defense counsel in general to investigate and
interview witnesses. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) (defense counsel
has an affirmative duty to investigate and interview witnesses); United States v. McVeigh,
918 F. Supp. 1452, 1459 (W.D. Okl. 1996)(counsel "has both an ethical obligation and
constitutional duty to conduct a thorough factual investigation and legal analysis"). To
rule otherwise would condone the ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Sanders,
271 Cal. Rptr. 534, 558 (Ct. App. 1990)(same).
II.

THE FAR-REACHING POLICY REPERCUSSIONS OF
THIS CASE, INCLUDING PROSECUTORIAL
INTERFERENCE IN CHOOSING DEFENSE COUNSEL
AND DISCOURAGING ZEALOUS COMPETENT
COUNSEL FROM SEEKING APPOINTMENTS IN
CAPITAL CASES, DEMAND REVERSAL OF THE
DISTRICT COURT AND RETENTION OF THE
DEFENSE TEAM.

In addition to the Sixth Amendment right to retain chosen counsel, disqualifying
the defense team in this case establishes a troubling far-reaching precedent for capital
cases in Utah and throughout the country. Where the prosecution in a capital case can
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remove defense counsel simply for interviewing witnesses, the prosecution can
effectively choose counsel for the defendant. Whether motivated by personal animus or a
good-faith belief of a conflict, the prosecution could exercise significant control over the
course of a capital case. Likewise, disqualifying competent zealous defense teams such
as the one in this case would dissuade qualified counsel from accepting appointments in
capital cases. This result violates Utah's own requirements for ensuring competent
defense counsel in all death-penalty cases under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.
A.

Prosecuting Agencies Have No Role in
Choosing Their Opponents.

The fair administration of justice demands that defense counsel be free from
prosecutorial influence or control. Due process of law requires that prosecutors play no
role in choosing their own adversaries. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981)(finding
due process violation where someone wilhout the accused's best interests was involved in
determining counsel). The prosecuting agency lacks standing even to object to the
appointment of counsel: "It is a matter between the Court, and their prospective lawyers.
As to that, the [prosecutors] are strangers, and indeed, it is inappropriate for them to seek
to stand in the way of that appointment." Death Row Petitioners v. Ridge, 948 F. Supp.
1278, 1279 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Like the right to retain appointed counsel, the unfettered appointment of counsel is
particularly vital in capital cases. It is undisputed that the selection of opposing counsel to represent a person on trial for his life - is the function of the court, not the prosecutor.
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Birch v. Mazander, 678 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1982); Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276 (5th
Cir. 1981); Bands v. United States, 614 F.2d 95, 96-97 (6th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Oxford,
575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978). Allowing prosecutors to influence the selection of
defense counsel creates an "unseemly appearance" where the state seeks to play a role in
determining counsel for someone the government is prosecuting, and reeks of "apparent
impropriety." United States v. Wilson, 354 F. Supp.2d 246, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). For this
very reason, motions to disqualify opposing counsel are "disfavored and are viewed with
suspicion." State v. Serna, 787 P.2d 1056, 1064 (Ariz. 1990); see also Gomez v. Superior
Court in and for Pinal County, 1X1 P.2d 902, 905 (Ariz. 1986) (court views with
suspicion motions by opposing counsel to disqualify a party's attorney based on conflict
of interest or appearance of impropriety); Weaver v. Millard, 819 P.2d 110, 115 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1991)(motion to disqualify from opposing party "should be viewed with
caution").
Along with disfavoring motions to disqualify, trial courts must also consider
whether the prosecution has an ulterior motive in seeking the removal of defense counsel.
In particular, prosecutors may have incentive to orchestrate a conflict to remove
competent or aggressive defense attorneys who could complicate or prolong the
proceedings. As the United States Supreme Court has held, in reviewing motions to
disqualify, trial courts must consider that prosecutors "may seek to 'manufacture' a
conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a particularly able defense counsel at
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his side." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163.
Prosecutorial influence in the decision to select defense counsel in capital cases
raises even more serious constitutional concerns. In Wilson, 354 F.Supp.2d at 253, for
example, the Government objected to the appointment of a state-funded capital defender
office to a federal death-penalty case. The court dismissed the Government's arguments
and held that disqualifying defense counsel absent some "compelling federal justification
for doing so would create the unseemly appearance that the government was playing a
significant role in choosing the representation for someone it is prosecuting. Surely the
apparent impropriety of such a situation would create a compelling issue for the appellate
courts to consider." Id.; see also Alexander v. Superior Ct.9 685 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz.
1984) ("Only in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere
with the attorney-client relationship of his opponent"); State v. Madrid, 468 P.2d 561, 562
(Ariz. 1970) (for prosecution to participate in selection or rejection of opposing counsel is
unseemly if for no other reason than the distasteful impression which could be conveyed).
Scholarly opinion supports this concern. In the federal courts, for example, as
defense counsel have increasingly challenged prosecutorial powers, prosecutors have
asserted their influence and resisted the effectiveness of defense attorneys. Alfredo
Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 35, 74-78 (1995). As defense counsel in the federal courts have become
more empowered, prosecutors have employed such tactics as "statutory forfeiture
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provisions, disqualification of counsel, law office searches, electronic surveillance of
attorneys, the use of informants at defense meetings, and required reporting to the Internal
Revenue Service of cash payments defense attorneys receive from clients." Id. at 78-80.
These attacks have led to the disqualification of equal opponents while the government
has "preserve[d] its competitive edge by forestalling the development of a strong
adversary capable of fighting on even terms." Id. at 80. Such tactics have not only
undermined the justice system and the public's confidence in it, they have also interfered
with criminal defendants' basic constitutional rights. Id. at 84-86; see also Morgan Cloud,
Forfeiting Defense Attorney Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define
Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wise. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
These concerns are apparent in this case where the experienced qualified defense
team immediately began to investigate key witnesses upon its appointment. Whether
consciously or not, the prosecution's attempt to relieve counsel created the impression
that the prosecution was seeking to alter the playing field because of Mr. Maughan's
formidable defense team. As the Stearnes court concluded with respect to the lack of a
judicial inquiry into allegations of misconduct, condoning prosecutorial influence in
deciding defense counsel would simply "encourage similar behavior. . . ." 780 S.W.2d at
225. For this reason, trial courts may not sever an attorney-client relationship absent the
"'most flagrant circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence.'" Huskey, 82
S.W.2d at 297 (quoting Cannon v. Comm 'n. on Judicial Qualifications, 537 P.2d 898,
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911 (Cal. 1975)). None of those circumstances exist here.
Improperly seeking the removal of defense counsel is particularly troubling given
prosecutors' duty to uphold the law. "In [the] role as the State's representative in criminal
matters, the prosecutor... must not only attempt to win cases, but must see that justice is
done." Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981). Although prosecutors have a
duty to "prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is as much [their] duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one." Id; see also State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thus, prosecutors must "'eschew all improper tactics.'" See State
v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, p i , 992 P.2d 951 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787
(Utah 1992)).
B.

Removing Qualified Defense Attorneys Will
Chill The Defense of Capital Defendants
Which, in Turn, Will Result in Less Qualified
Counsel Seeking Appointments to Capital
Cases.

Affirming the district court's decision to disqualify will also result in less qualified
defense counsel being appointed to capital cases. Constitutional requirements and Utah
law require defense counsel in capital cases to show an extraordinary amount of
education, skill, training, and education, not required of other attorneys. Readily
disqualifying competent defense counsel at the urging of prosecutors will merely leave a
field of unqualified attorneys to handle capital cases. This concern is particularly acute in
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smaller Utah counties where qualified defense counsel may not be found.
As detailed above, the United States Supreme Court has been exacting in requiring
competent defense counsel in capital cases. Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2466; Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 522. In similar fashion, Utah law seeks to ensure competent defense counsel
regardless of where a person is tried. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires a high level of training and experience before attorneys may represent capital
defendants:
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an
indigent defendant who is charged with an offense for which the
punishment may be death, the court shall appoint two or more
attorneys to represent such defendant and shall make a finding
on the record based on the requirements set forth below that
appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In
making its determination, the court shall ensure that the
experience of counsel who are under consideration for
appointment have met the following minimum requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to
verdict six felony cases within the past four years or twenty-five
felony cases total;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as
counsel or co-counsel in a capital or a felony homicide case
which was tried to a jury and which went to final verdict;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed
or taught within the past five years an approved continuing legal
education course or courses at least eight hours of which deal,
in substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and
(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total
not less than five years in the active practice of law.
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(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a
capital case, the court should also consider at least the following
factors:
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration
have previously appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a capital
case;
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have
sufficient time and support and can dedicate those resources to
the representation of the defendant in the capital case now
pending before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant;
(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have
engaged in the active practice of criminal law in the pastfiveyears;
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being
considered; and
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination
that counsel to be appointed will fairly, efficiently and
effectively provide representation to the defendant.
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to
death, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent
such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that counsel
is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be found
proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to death, the
combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the
following requirements:
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least
three felony appeals; and
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed
within the past five years an approved continuing legal
education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial
or appeal of death penalty cases.
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Utah R. Crim. P. 8(b), (c), (d).
Federal law requires similar accreditation. Defense counsel in federal capital cases
must be "learned in the law," which generally suggests "distinguished prior experience in
the trial, appeal, or post-conviction review of federal death penalty cases, or distinguished
prior experience in state death penalty trial, appeals, or post-conviction review that, in
combination with co-counsel, will assure high quality representation." 18 U.S.C. § 3005.
"Given these exacting qualifications and the demanding nature of the representation,
there are relatively few members of the bar who are suitable for appointment." Wilson,
354 F. Supp.2d at 249.
Allowing the prosecution to easily remove qualified defense counsel erodes these
requirements. When courts disqualify counsel without an exacting inquiry as the
prosecution suggests in this case, competent defense counsel cannot fulfill their
constitutional and legal obligations:
[T]o acquiesce and condone such [] behavior will surely
encourage similar behavior and substantially encroaches on the
honest good-faith efforts of appointed counsel to represent their
client and present their cause, thereby putting the independence
of the bar into jeopardy.
Steames, 780 S.W.2d at 225. To avoid such results, courts must ensure the quality and
competency of defense counsel and safeguard the "independence" of defense counsel
without fear of judges or prosecutors interfering in the representation of their clients. Id;
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Smith, 440 P.2d at 74; Huskey, 82 S.W.2d at 307.
Removing qualified defense counsel will, in turn, inhibit counsel from vigorously
representing capital defendants. Ineffective assistance claims will inevitably follow:
[I]f the advocate must labor under the threat that, at any moment, if his
argument or advocacy should incur the displeasure or lack of immediate
comprehension by the trial judge, he may be summarily relieved as counsel on
a subjective charge of incompetency by the very trial judge he is attempting to
convince, his advocacy must of necessity be most guarded and lose much of
its force and effect.
Smith, 440 P.2d at 74.
Such pressures on defense counsel, thus, cause the very problem that the
prosecution purports to be attempting to avoid - injecting reversible error into a capital
case at the outset. Instead of refusing to allow defense counsel to proceed with a conflict
of interest as the prosecutor contends, removing the defense team raises the far more
likely prospect of reversal on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. Huskey, 82
S.W.2d at 302. When, as here, prosecutors interfere with the defense investigation and
seek disqualification absent flagrant misconduct, they substantially increase the chances
of having to try a case twice. Id. As one federal court recently recognized, "the issue of
appeal as a separate concern seems to be beside the point. In any event, if the issue of the
viability of the Defendant's appeal were to factor directly into the court's consideration, it
would work in precisely the opposite manner than that advanced by the government."
Wilson, 354 F. Supp.2d at 253.
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Of further concern, the removal of competent counsel will open the door for less
qualified attorneys to seek appointments in death-penalty cases. When courts or
prosecutors interfere in investigations, defense counsel will naturally be leery of
accepting already-difficult, complex capital cases. Smith, 440 P.2d at 74. Dissuading
competent defense counsel would be felt the hardest in rural counties where few defense
counsel reside or practice. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 already limits the pool of
qualified counsel in capital cases. If trial courts were to routinely disqualify defense
counsel based on the type of diligent representation in this case, the pool of willing and
able defense attorneys would shrink to near nothing in the less populated corners of the
state. Since the State of Utah has chosen to enact the death penalty, it stands to reason
that the state, through its judges and prosecutors, must allow those attorneys who are
deemed qualified to represent capital defendants to conduct the caliber of investigations
required under the Sixth Amendment and other legal requirements.
CONCLUSION
For the important constitutional and systemic reasons detailed above, UACDL
requests this Court to reverse the district court's ruling disqualifying one of the defense
attorneys but allowing the other defense counsel to remain on the case.
Dated this 5th day of January, 2007.

KENT R. HART
UACDL President
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ADDENDA
Addendum A
Addendum B
Addendum C
Addendum D

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a)
U.S. Constitution Amendent VI.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8
18U.S.C. §3005

Addendum A

Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought
by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order with
the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the entry
of the order of the trial court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A timely
appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the
appellate court determines is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order.
The appellate court may direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the
requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule.

Addendum B

Rights of the accused.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.

Addendum C

Rule 8. Appointment of counsel.

(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to
self representation, and if indigent, has the right to courtappointed counsel if the defendant faces a substantial probability
of deprivation of liberty.
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an
indigent defendant who is charged with an offense for which the
punishment may be death, the court shall appoint two or more
attorneys to represent such defendant and shall make a finding
on the record based on the requirements set forth below that
appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In
making its determination, the court shall ensure that the
experience of counsel who are under consideration for
appointment have met the following minimum requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to
verdict six felony cases within the past four years or twenty-five
felony cases total;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as
counsel or co-counsel in a capital or a felony homicide case
which was tried to a jury and which went to final verdict;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed
or taught within the past five years an approved continuing legal
education course or courses at least eight hours of which deal,
in substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and.
(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total
not less than five years in the active practice of law.
(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a
capital case, the court should also consider at least the following
factors:
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration
have previously appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a capital
case;

(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have
sufficient time and support and can dedicate those resources to
the representation of the defendant in the capital case now
pending before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant;
(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have
engaged in the active practice of criminal law in the pastfiveyears;
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being
considered; and.
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination
that counsel to be appointed will fairly, efficiently and
effectively provide representation to the defendant.
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to
death, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent
such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that counsel
is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be found
proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to death, the
combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the
following requirements:
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least
three felony appeals; and.
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed
within the past five years an approved continuing legal
education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial
or appeal of death penalty cases.
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an
indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to
represent such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on postconviction appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is
qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in postconviction cases. To be found qualified, the combined
experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following
requirements:

(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as
counsel in at least three felony or post-conviction appeals;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as
counsel or co-counsel in a post-conviction case at the
evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended
and completed or taught within the past five years an approved
continuing legal education course which dealt, in substantial
part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with the
prosecution or defense of post-conviction proceedings in death
penalty cases;
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to
judgment or verdict three civil jury or felony cases within the
past four years or ten cases total; and.
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must
total not less than five years in the active practice of law.
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the
guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be grounds for
establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively represented the
defendant at trial or on appeal.
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid
as described in Chapter 32 of Title 77.
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be
paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c).

Addendum D

§ 3005. Counsel and witnesses in capital cases
Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be allowed to make his full
defense by counsel; and the court before which the defendant is to be tried, or a judge
thereof, shall promptly, upon the defendant's request, assign 2 such counsel, of whom at least
1 shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases, and who shall have free access to the
accused at all reasonable hours. In assigning counsel under this section, the court shall
consider the recommendation of the Federal Public Defender organization, or, if no such
organization exists in the district, of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
The defendant shall be allowed, in his defense to make any proof that he can produce by
lawful witnesses, and shall have the like process of the court to compel his witnesses to
appear at his trial, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on behalf of the
prosecution.

